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Introduction: From The Puritan To The Constitutional Founding 
The Puritans’ holy experiment in New England, begun in the early 
17th century, was very different from the late 18th century reality of 
America. Puritan leaders had envisioned a glorious “city on a hill” where 
church and state cooperated to ensure a Christian commonwealth. But a 
century later, this dream had turned into the messy reality of a religiously 
diverse community. Not only was there no federal religious establish-
ment, but most colonies also rejected religious establishments. Connecti-
cut and Massachusetts hung on to the vestiges of their establishments for 
two or three decades, until 1818 and 1833 respectively. But these states’ 
capitulation was just a matter of time. By then, disestablishment and the 
principle of religious voluntarism had become as much the American 
Way as religious establishment had been the Puritan and New England 
Way. 
This change was not a top-down affair foisted by a small group of 
deist elites on an unsuspecting and more conventionally religious popu-
lace. As law professor Carl Esbeck recently noted, “the American dises-
tablishment occurred over a fifty-to-sixty year period, from 1774 to the 
early 1830s” and was “entirely a state-law affair,” completely independ-
ent of the Revolution or the adoption of the Bill of Rights.1 Thus, the 
                                                
1 Carl H. Esbeck, “Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in 
the Early American Republic,” Brigham Young University Law Review 4 (2004): 1590. 
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credit for disestablishment cannot be placed on a small, elite group of 
enlightenment thinkers gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new national 
constitution. Rather, it was a populist movement throughout the states 
where religious, rather than enlightenment influences, were predominant. 
As Esbeck puts it, “at the state level, where the work of disestablishment 
did take place, the vast number of those pushing for it were not doing so 
out of rationalism or secularism. Rather, they were religious people who 
sought disestablishment for (as they saw it) biblical reasons.”2 
Much of the scholarship surrounding the founding period and dises-
tablishment has focused on secular Enlightenment and Republican influ-
ences.3 Many of the national founders were Enlightenment thinkers who 
leaned toward or accepted deistic beliefs. Because of this, those analyz-
ing the impulses to disestablishment have often given religion a secon-
dary, supporting role. A ritual nod is usually given to Roger Williams 
and a handful of Baptists and Quakers. But even those authors who ac-
knowledge a role for religion in the journey to disestablishment tend 
place the heavy ideological lifting on the shoulders of secular thought.4  
                                                
2 Esbeck, 1590. 
3 Two of the most influential, now classic, works on the revolutionary period ac-
knowledge some religious influence, but focus almost entirely on secular Republican and 
Enlightenment ideals arising out of certain strands of British politics. Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967) xi-xii; 
Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, (New York: Vintage, 
1993), 4-5.  
4 William Lee Miller traces three roots of religious liberty—the Enlightenment, Re-
publicanism, and dissenting religion—and uses the figures of Jefferson and Madison, 
contemporaries of the constitutional founding, to illustrate the Enlightenment and Repub-
lican streams. But he reaches back nearly 150 years to pluck his religious voice, that of 
Roger Williams, who serves, by Miller’s own admission, more as a symbol for dissenting 
ideas, rather than as a historical figure with direct influence on the constitutional found-
ing. William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic, (New 
York: Paragon House, 1988), 153-155. Other recent works acknowledge the influence of 
religion on disestablishment, but generally describe it in terms of either religious minori-
ties’ self-protective responses to majoritarian religion or of the general pragmatic re-
sponse of society to a growing religious pluralism. Frank Lambert, The Founding Fathers 
and the Place of Religion in America, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). John Witte, Jr., 
Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential Rights and Liberties, 
(Boulder: Westview, 2000). In both these works, the emphasis on the role of religion is 
that of pragmatic response to American pluralism, rather then the principled outgrowth of 
religious ideology. The two main religious impulses are seen as either a pragmatic desire 
by religious minorities to avoid persecution or a practical recognition by mainstream 
religious groups that to live in peace in a diverse and pluralistic religious community 
required some kind of widespread tolerance and eventually disestablishment. Religious 
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But once one turns, in an attempt to account for widespread state dis-
establishment, from the elites to the grass-roots, religious thought be-
comes much more important.5 And thus the conundrum emerges. How 
did it happen that the Puritan Way in the northeast, and the Anglican es-
tablishments in the South, were ideologically routed by persecuted bands 
of Baptists, a small group of Quakers in the middle colonies, and a dead 
religious radical from Rhode Island? 
Perhaps this is overstating the case for effect, but not by much. It is 
as though the Puritan and Anglican establishments were a powerful 
steam locomotive that disappeared into a tunnel in the late 1600s. The 
engine was distantly trailed by a car of dissent, containing agitators like 
Williams and Hutchinson, a trailing caboose, at times abandoned on iso-
lated side-tracks. But lo, when the train emerges into the uplands of the 
mid-1700s, the “radicals” have assumed command of the steam engine, 
and the “theocrats” are nearly out of steam, soon to be shunted off to the 
scrap-yard. 
How did this change happen? One standard explanation is that the re-
ligious revival and agitation caused by the Great Awakenings greatly 
increased the power and influence of the dissenting sects.6 Understanda-
bly, those in the minority favored disestablishment, as they were op-
pressed by it, and thus religious revivals would tend to help weaken re-
ligious establishment. And the growth of religious diversity would 
weaken the ability of any one group to impose its form of religion or 
worship.7  
                                                                                                         
belief or theology is usually seen as an afterthought to justify an otherwise socially, cul-
turally, or politically necessary, or at least desirable, state. Probably the best work to ac-
knowledge the ideological contributions of religion is Chris Beneke’s recent book, Be-
yond Toleration: The Religious Origins of American Pluralism (New York: Oxford UP, 
2006). Beneke notes, as do I in this article, the central role that the “right of private 
judgment” played in turning the culture of eighteenth-century America into one open to 
pluralism and disestablishment. He even identifies this principle with Protestants, but 
suggests that they adopted the principle from enlightenment thinkers. This article argues 
that the “right of private judgment” has distinctly religious roots and that this can be dis-
cerned from the writings of the three authors examined in this paper. 
5 As Nathan Hatch put it, “the rise of evangelical Christianity in the early republic is, 
in some measure, a story of the success of the common people in shaping the culture after 
their own priorities rather than the priorities outlined by gentlemen such as the framers of 
the constitution.” Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity, (New 
Haven: Yale UP 1989), 9. 
6 Idem, 59-61. 
7 Idem, 64-65. 
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This explanation, however, tends to degrade the religious impulse to 
a mere doctrine of self-preservation or convenience. It is viewed as the 
inevitable pragmatic response made by any minority, religious or other-
wise, facing persecution.8 Thus, the attention returns, for the philosophi-
cal or theoretical heavy lifting needed for a long-term disestablishment, 
to the developing philosophical or political streams that the religious 
ideas find themselves caught up with. But this cannot be the whole story. 
Many of the Colonial disestablishments occurred prior to the First Great 
Awakening, or in the religiously quiet era of the Revolution prior to the 
Second Awakening.  
Indeed, it is clear that in a number of instances a theologically-based 
legal commitment to toleration and disestablishment preceded and ap-
pears to have caused the pluralistic social and religious conditions that 
are often cited as the pragmatic reasons for disestablishment. The most 
obvious examples of this are Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, where the 
founders—Roger Williams and William Penn respectively—created le-
gal frameworks for their colonies based explicitly on their theological 
commitments to freedom of conscience and religious tolerance.9 New 
Jersey and Delaware were also shaped by William Penn and other Quak-
ers, and are places where the principle of tolerance preceded the growth 
of pluralism.  
New York is also a candidate for this category. While historically 
possessing an established church—first Dutch Reformed, then Angli-
can—New York, when it was the New Netherlands, had experienced a 
robust religious tolerance under Dutch rule. This had led to a religious 
and ethnic diversity that prevented the Anglican establishment from tak-
ing meaningful hold.10 Further, many of the groups who agitated for dis-
establishment, such as the Baptists, did not change their position on this 
                                                
8 Bernard Bailyn, in his classic treatise on the American Revolution, described the 
opposition to establishments as generally “unsystematic, incomplete, pragmatic,” and 
“little grounded in doctrine.” The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cam-
bridge: Harvard UP, 1967), 248-250. Gordon Wood portrays religious groups as basically 
a force in opposition to disestablishment: The Radicalism of the American Revolution 
(New York: Knopf, 1992), 330-331. For a more recent forceful exposition that disestab-
lishment and the separation of church and state were initially a purely secular, republican 
affair, see Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
2002), 144 ff. 
9 Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Pas-
sage of the First Amendment, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986). 
10 Richard W. Pointer, Protestant Pluralism and the New York Experience, (Bloom-
ington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1988), 1-3. 
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question long after they had achieved comfortable majority status. Thus, 
the position appears to have had some principled basis beyond mere self-
preservation or a pragmatic response to pluralism. 
This paper attempts to understand more fully the religious impulses 
towards disestablishment in pre-revolutionary America. It does so by 
analyzing three major statements on religious liberty, made by three 
prominent religious leaders, from three points in the religious and social 
triangle of the day: a Quaker—William Penn; a Baptist—Isaac Backus; 
and a Puritan—Elisha Williams. This paper will compare and contrast 
their arguments for religious liberty and disestablishment, especially 
their theological and biblical arguments. It will attempt to discover any 
shared religious, theological visions of religious freedom that cut across 
these rather broad Protestant sectarian boundaries.  
If it is possible to discern some underlying theological or biblical 
themes that are common to all three views, this would provide some 
meaningful evidence that the religious dissent of the day had principled, 
doctrinal content to go along with its pragmatic concerns. The greater the 
coincidence of shared theology, the stronger support it provides for the 
argument that the religious response included principled, doctrinally-
driven components, rather than being merely pragmatic arguments in 
superficial religious dress. Proving such a point would require looking at 
many more than three individuals. But a broader survey would lose the 
ability to grapple in-depth with the details of the theological arguments 
being made. It is the goal of this paper to compare and contrast meaning-
fully the theology of the three authors, to gauge the kind and depth of 
theological ideas involved. It would be a future project to survey the ex-
tent and pervasiveness of these theological views in colonial America 
and their direct impact, if any, on legal ideas.  
The three figures chosen were well-respected and well-known lead-
ers within their confessional affiliations. Because of this, it can be as-
sumed with some safety that they write from within the tradition of scrip-
tural understanding of their faith communities. Between the three, one 
will expect differences, of course: both in outlook, arguments, and end-
ing points. But as this article will show, underneath the differences of 
class, education, and religious outlook, a consistently similar argument 
emerged. It is one based on principled theological views of the personal 
nature of human spiritual epistemology, the resulting absence of final 
earthly spiritual authority, and the consequent prohibition of the use of 
force in the jurisdiction of religion. These ideas worked in harmony to 
support the proposal of disestablishment. It is also argued that this group 
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of ideas is associated with the reformation doctrine of the “priesthood of 
all believers” and the corollary idea of the “right of private judgment in 
matters of biblical interpretation.” 
This article looks at each of the historic figures, Penn, Williams, and 
Backus. It examines briefly the person and place of the writer and the 
immediate setting of the statement under review. It then gives an over-
view of each statement, with a focus on the theological arguments raised. 
Finally, the theological themes common to the three subjects will be 
compared and contrasted. 
 
I. William Penn—The Privileged Dissenter 
For many years in Philadelphia, it was unlawful to erect a building 
any higher than the statue of William Penn that stood atop town hall. 
This was an ironic role for a figure of a man who in life, as a practicing 
Quaker, believed that no human being deserved the deference or homage 
of as much as a removed hat. But Penn was no ordinary Quaker. He was 
born in 1644 into a family of relative wealth, privilege, and power.11  
Americans know Penn as the founder of Pennsylvania. But most 
probably do not know that the colony was not named for William, but for 
his father, a well-connected Admiral in the British navy. His well-to-do 
background allowed him a privileged education. He attended Christ 
Church College, Oxford, in 1660, where he had contact with John Locke, 
who at the time was a tutor at Christ Church, and Dr. John Owen, a well-
known dissenting Puritan theologian. 
Penn then went on a gentleman’s finishing trip to Europe. While in 
France, Penn’s serious religious nature again revealed itself by his deci-
sion to attend the Protestant Academy of Saumur. There, he studied un-
der Moise Amyraut, a leading Calvinist theologian who played a key role 
in promoting religious toleration in France. After Penn returned to Eng-
land, his father desired him to assist with the family business in Ireland. 
In preparation for that role, Penn studied law in London for a year, which 
put the finishing polish on his dissenting advocacy skills.  
He went to Ireland to manage his father’s estates, and there he came 
into contact with the Quakers. Impressed with their piety and apparently 
primitive Christianity, he soon joined the sect. Penn quickly assumed the 
                                                
11 The details found in this summary of Penn’s early life were taken from Mary K. 
Geiter, Profiles in Power: William Penn, (Singapore: Pearson Education Asia, 2000), 13-
21; Mary Maples Dunn, William Penn: Politics and Conscience, (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1967), 3-6; Andrew R. Murphy, Ed., The Political Writings of William Penn, (Indi-
anapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002). 
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role of advocate and champion for the oppressed Quakers. Due to his 
background and education, he had connections at the royal palace, at the 
courts, and in the boards of commerce. He used these connections to ele-
vate the plight of the disenfranchised, often persecuted Quakers to new 
heights of visibility.  
In choosing to become a Quaker, Penn appeared to give up a life of 
privilege and power—Quakers were ineligible to hold government of-
fice. The irony is, of course, that had he not become a Quaker, Penn 
would as likely be as unfamiliar to most of us today as is the naval career 
of his father. 
A. Context of The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience. At times, 
Penn’s advocacy work became alarmingly hands on, at least in his fa-
ther’s opinion. Penn spent time in prison for personally violating restric-
tions on dissent. It was during one of these times in prison in 1670 that 
Penn wrote The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience. The immediate 
target of this document was the newly passed Conventicle Act, which 
forbade non-conforming sects from gathering for worship. But Penn used 
the opportunity to unleash the full range of his historical, theological, and 
legal training on the question of liberty of conscience and the roles of 
church and state.  
The document was written in an English prison, by an Englishman, 
to an English King and English public. But it is also an American histori-
cal document, for it details the religious/political thought of a man who, 
in shaping three American colonies and their governments,12 arguably 
“left a greater mark on British North America than any other single indi-
vidual in the colonial era.”13  
B. Overview of The Great Case.14 In pressing a case, the legally 
trained Penn tended to leave no argument unused. He marshals a wide 
range of arguments, many of which appear to overlap. Penn aids the 
reader by putting forward the arguments under very specific headings: 
the nature and rights of God; the nature of Christianity; the teachings of 
the Bible; arguments from nature and reason; the nature of good gov-
ernment; and the witness of history. For our purposes, however, his theo-
logical arguments are of greatest interest. 
                                                
12 Along with Pennsylvania, Penn worked with the Quakers who founded New Jer-
sey, and Delaware continued under his oversight even after it split from Pennsylvania. 
Esbeck, 1461, 1468-69.  
13 Geiter, back cover. 
14 The text of the “Great Case” used here is taken from Murphy, ed., 79-119. 
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
144 
1. Nature and Rights of God. Penn’s first argument is a clever rever-
sal of the usual modern claim for human rights. Rather than starting with 
his, or the Quaker’s, inalienable right to worship, he starts with God’s 
right to man’s worship. Rather than defending his turf, he chooses to de-
fend God’s turf. This, at least as a rhetorical matter, raises considerably 
the ante for his opponents. As Penn puts the argument in his title head-
ing, “That Imposition, Restraint, and Persecution for Conscience-Sake, 
highly Invade the Divine Prerogative, and Divest the Almighty of a 
Right, due to none beside Himself.”15 
2. Biblical Teachings. Penn then moves on to explicit biblical teach-
ing on the question of force in religion. He lists twelve different texts, or 
groups of texts, as opposing force in religion. The groups can be divided 
into three main categories: texts detailing limits on human knowledge, 
texts detailing limits on human spiritual authority, and texts describing 
appropriate Christian conduct or praxis in relation to power.16  
Penn begins with rather an obscure verse, Job 32:8, which says “The 
Inspiration of the Almighty gives Understanding.” This is the second 
time that Penn cites this text in his book, and it gives support to a very 
basic argument regarding human understanding and epistemology that he 
relies on throughout his work. In Penn’s words, “If no Man can believe 
before he understands, and no Man can understand before he is inspir’d 
of God,” then it is unreasonable and inhuman to punish someone for not 
believing something.17  
He then cites several other verses that emphasize the limits of human 
knowledge and the need to rely on God for true spiritual knowledge. 
“Woe unto them that take Counsel, but not of me” (Isa 30:1). “Let the 
Wheat and the Tares grow together, until the end of the world,” because, 
the implication is, the Christian cannot always tell one from the other 
(Matt 13:27). It is the “Spirit of Truth” that shall “lead you into all 
Truth” (John 16:8,13). 
This argument regarding the limits of human knowledge, and how 
humans gain spiritual knowledge, is then followed by a logical corollary: 
If humans cannot know spiritual truth, except from God through the Holy 
Spirit, then no human is in a position, or has the authority, to ultimately 
judge others in spiritual matters. Thus, Jesus said that “the Princes of the 
Gentiles, exercise Dominion over them . . . but it shall not be so among 
                                                
15 Idem, 84. 
16 Idem, 90-91. 
17 Idem, 90. 
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you.” In Matt 20:25 Jesus indicated there were different realms, Caesar’s 
and God’s, and that God’s did not involve force (Luke 20:25; 9:54-56). 
The last group of texts represents the conclusion on how Christians 
should act, with meekness and use of persuasion, given the first two 
premises. The three group of texts work very like a syllogism. If only 
one with full spiritual knowledge has authority to judge, and humans lack 
full spiritual knowledge for others, then they cannot judge and coerce in 
spiritual matters. Or to put it positively, each individual must seek spiri-
tual knowledge directly from God. And no individual has ultimate spiri-
tual authority over another. Thus, the Christian practice should be one of 
persuasion, not of force.  
3. Nature and Reason. Penn’s next category is explicitly based on 
philosophical reasoning, rather than on theology or the Bible. In this sec-
tion he draws a distinction between arguments from nature and argu-
ments from reason. The former consist of arguments from universal hu-
man experiences, and the latter consists of truths from the world of logic.  
He also argues from the field of the nature, execution, and end of 
good government. Penn proposes that the nature of good government is 
justice, and that religious force violates the principles of equality, fair-
ness, and proportionality inherent in a just state. He then turns to the 
heart of his legal argument concerning laws and government, that the 
great rights to liberty and property set down in English law, extending 
back to the Magna Charta, cannot be undone by more recent laws, which 
merely build on these foundational laws. 
C. Conclusion Regarding Penn. Three main points can be made 
about Penn’s use of theological arguments. The first is that his theologi-
cal argument for religious liberty appealed first to God’s rights, rather 
than human rights. The second is that his theological arguments were not 
limited to biblical arguments, but he drew broadly from the world of 
natural theology and philosophy. The final point is that his use of theol-
ogy and scripture emphasized the limits on human spiritual knowledge 
and religious authority as a basis for not using civil force in religious 
matters.  
 The second and third points are particularly significant for how they 
parallel the other two authors we will examine, and these points will be 
discussed in the conclusion to the paper. But the first point is somewhat 
unique to Penn and deserves comment here. 
Penn’s formulation turns the contemporary vision of religious free-
dom and civil liberties on its head. Rather than starting with man and 
moving outward, Penn starts with God and moves downward. It is not 
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human rights he is expounding, but God’s right to human worship and 
devotion. The corollary of God’s right to human worship is Penn’s duty 
to worship God, with which the state is interfering. 
The constitutional founders were aware of this manner of formulat-
ing the issue. Madison, in his famed Memorial and Remonstrance, gave 
as his first reason for religious liberty the fact that worship was “a duty 
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This 
duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the 
claims of Civil Society,” and as such, it must be respected by Civil Soci-
ety.18  
 
II. Elisha Williams—The Orthodox Lawyer 
The “River Gods” was the name given to a series of imposing aristo-
cratic leaders in the towns along the Connecticut River in western Mas-
sachusetts during the 18th century. 19 Elisha Williams, born in about 1694, 
was a prominent member of one of the gentry families so designated. He 
was part of a long line of eminent ministers, military men, and magis-
trates in the region, and was a cousin of the Puritan divine Jonathan Ed-
wards. His eventual role as dissenter from the decrees of the established 
order, then, was less a parish squabble, and more akin to the drama of a 
Wagnerian opera—a battle among the gods of New England, with seri-
ous, statewide political careers and influences at stake. 
Unlike his brothers and cousins, Elisha20 did not follow the tradi-
tional Williams path to the Presbyterian pulpit. While he studied theol-
ogy as a youth, he took up teaching and avoided taking on a pulpit. At 
one point, he studied law in preparation for a legal career, but ended up 
using his legal training as a state assemblyman and a judge, rather than a 
practicing lawyer. When he was 25 or 26, Elisha underwent a fuller con-
version experience and decided to enter the ministry after all.  
                                                
18 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
1785. 
19 The factual background for this summary of Elisha Williams’ life was taken from 
Kevin Michael Sweeney, “River Gods and Related Minor Deities: The Williams Family 
and the Connecticut River Valley, 1637-1790” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, New Haven, 
1986). 
20 Due to the number of other prominent Williamses in his family, the other well 
known religious liberty advocate Roger Williams, and the fact that Penn’s first name was 
William, I will refer to Elisha Williams as “Elisha’ throughout this discussion. 
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He pastored for three or four years before accepting the rectorship of 
Yale college. The previous head of Yale had tried to take the college 
down an Anglican, Arminian-friendly road, and the trustees were anx-
ious to re-establish a reformed orthodoxy. Elisha more than met these 
expectations. In an opening sermon he re-affirmed Calvin’s fundamen-
tals of utter depravity, election, predestination, and irresistible grace. But 
he did so in a way that showed he was open to further developments on 
how these doctrines functioned in light of contemporary thinkers like 
Locke. 
A. Setting of A Seasonable Plea. It was Elisha’s openness to the ad-
vancing nature of truth that placed him at the center of the controversy of 
the First Great Awakening between the religious enthusiasm of the “new 
lights” and the traditional “old light” establishment. By the time the 
Awakening was under way in 1740, Elisha had resigned his Yale post to 
recover his health and to pursue a career in Connecticut politics. Shortly 
thereafter, despite losing a race for governorship, Elisha was made a 
judge on the Superior Court, as well as Speaker of the Assembly.  
At about that time, the Connecticut Assembly passed a bill that 
placed stiff restrictions on itinerant preachers and made it difficult for 
settled preachers to speak outside their own districts. While Elisha was 
opposed to some of the excesses of the Awakening, he supported what he 
thought was “agreeable to true Principles of Calvinism.” He was not op-
posed to appropriate enthusiasm in religion, and was counted among the 
“new lights.”  
Elisha spoke against the new law, in the assembly and in public. His 
stand came at a cost. Elisha was aware of the risks, but stated his intent 
to “act his own Principles, let Man make what Use of it they please, and 
he would serve Mankind as well as he could, so far as they would let 
him.”21 In 1743, the assembly removed him from his judgeship, and 
shortly afterwards, he also lost his appointment as justice of the peace. 
While his political fortunes later rebounded, such a result was by no 
means certain. 
It was in 1744 that Elisha wrote his Seasonable Plea for The Liberty 
of Conscience, an exposition of the principles of religious liberty in the 
context of the anti-itinerancy law.  
B. Overview of A Seasonable Plea. In a short introduction, Elisha 
introduces his recurring theme and central point: That as the “Sacred 
Scriptures are the alone Rule of Faith and Practice to a Christian . . . that 
                                                
21 Idem, 316. 
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every Christian has a Right of judging for himself what he is to believe 
and practice.”22 And that it is thus “perfectly inconsistent with any Power 
in the civil Magistrate to make any penal Laws in Matters of Religion.”23 
Protestants, he notes, are agreed in the profession of this principle, but 
too many have departed from it in practice. He then launches into a phi-
losophical and religious discourse to demonstrate the truth of the above 
propositions. 
1. Origin and Ends of Civil Government. Where Penn began with 
spiritual and divine, the nature and rights of God’s kingdom, Elisha be-
gins with the temporal and earthly, the rights and limits of civil king-
doms. He begins with an overview of the origins and ends of civil gov-
ernment. His argument is based, by his own references, on the work of 
John Locke. He starts with the equality men have in the state of nature, at 
least by the time they attain the age of reason. Reason is the basis of un-
derstanding, free choice, and action, and is thus, in Elisha’s view, the 
basis of natural freedom. It is this very reason that tells us that all are 
born with equal rights to liberty and property. 
But these rights to liberty and property cannot be well preserved in 
the state of nature. Governments are instituted to preserve and protect 
these rights. The state draws its power from the people, and its legitimate 
end is the preservation of persons, liberties, and estates. Given these ends 
of government, Elisha moves on to discuss what liberty or power persons 
give up to the civil government to allow it to accomplish its ends.24 The 
two primary objects people give up are the power to preserve his person 
and property, and the freedom from societal laws that protect the persons 
and properties of others. 
2. Rights Retained by the Individual. Elisha now he comes to his 
main concern, which is the liberties and rights that people retain upon 
entering civil society. He begins with the general rule that no more natu-
ral liberty or power is given up than is necessary for the preservation of 
persons and property.25 Thus, persons retain all their natural liberties that 
have no relation to the ends of society. They can read Locke, or Milton, 
or the Bible, and the state has no business interfering.  
                                                
22 Elisha Williams, A Seasonable Plea for the Liberty of Conscience and the Right of 
Private Judgment in Matters of Religion, (Boston: S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1744), 1 
(emphasis in original), viewed in Early American Imprints, 1st Series, no. 5520. 
23 Idem. 
24 Idem, 5. 
25 Idem, 6. 
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Second, he states that persons retain the right of judging in matters of 
religion. This is a right based on the nature of humanity, which is that of 
a rational, reasonable being, capable of knowledge of his Maker, and 
accountable to that Maker for his actions. As faith and religious practice 
depend on individual judgment and choice, that faith cannot, logically, 
depend on the will of another human.26  
The reasonable nature of humanity is such a key point for Elisha’s 
argument for liberty that it is worth quoting at length from him on it:  
 
This Right of judging every one for himself in Matters of Re-
ligion results from the Nature of Man, and is so inseparably 
connected therewith, that a Man can no more part with it than 
he can with his Power of Thinking . . . —A man may alienate 
some Branches of his Property and give up his Rights in them 
to others; but he cannot transfer the Rights of Conscience, un-
less he could destroy his rational and moral Powers, or substi-
tute some other to be judged for him at the Tribunal of God.27 
 
Thus, Elisha takes an opposite, though complementary approach to 
Penn. Rather than focusing on God’s power and privileges and following 
up with human duties, Elisha rests his argument on the essence of the 
nature of man, as God created him. But like Penn, while this argument is 
theological in nature, drawing on the nature of man and his relation to 
God, Elisha does not base it explicitly on biblical authority. Rather, it is 
an argument from reason, an argument of natural theology. Elisha ac-
knowledges this difference by explicitly next turning to the Bible as an 
additional, second argument to support his thesis that religious matters 
are issues of private concern. 
3. The Bible and the Right of Private Judgment. To “further clear this 
Point,” the sole propriety of private religious judgment and to show the 
extent of it, Elisha next appeals to the “Truth, That the Sacred Scriptures 
are the alone Rule of Faith and Practice to every individual Christian.”28 
Here, Elisha begins an extended Bible study that supports from the Bible 
the points made in his previous arguments from reason and nature. He 
begins to trace arguments strikingly similar to those of William Penn 
about spiritual epistemology, authority, and the limits of human spiritual 
power and oversight.  
                                                
26 Idem, 7-8. 
27 Idem, 8 (emphasis in original). 
28 Idem. 
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But where Penn started, as a Quaker would, with texts regarding 
Christians being taught directly of God, and receiving truth from the 
Spirit, Elisha starts with texts asserting the basic Protestant doctrine of 
biblical supremacy in religious matters. He quotes 2 Tim 3:15-16, that 
scripture is “given by inspiration from God, and is profitable for Doc-
trine, for Reproof, for Correction, for Instruction in Righteousness,” and 
John 20:31, that “these things are written that ye might believe that Jesus 
is the Christ . . . and that believing ye might have Life through his 
name.” 
Having asserted biblical supremacy, he then moves to the right of 
every person to “read, inquire and impartially judge” the meaning of 
scripture for himself.29 No person or group, whether pope, priest, bishop, 
pastor, counsel or civil body can be the final authority on biblical matters 
for the individual. If any earthly authority was the final arbiter of biblical 
matters, that authority would replace the scriptures as the final author-
ity.30  
This means that believers have the duty to check pastors and teachers 
by the Word. He cites Acts 17:11, where Paul commends the Bereans for 
checking his own teachings against the Hebrew scriptures, and quotes 1 
Cor 10:15, where Paul says, “I speak as to wise Men, judge ye what I 
say.”31 This is the very nature of the biblical rule of faith and practice, as 
acceptance of human authority would become a rule of human faith and 
practice. The Bible is the tool by which Christ rules the church, and any 
other rule is to deny Christ the right to be “King in his own Kingdom.”32  
Here Elisha has begun to echo some of Penn’s initial arguments 
about the “rights of God,” and it brings him to a similar concluding point 
regarding civil power: it has no jurisdiction in religious matters—both 
because of the affirmative lack and because of the existing jurisdiction 
claimed by God and Christ.33 As an Englishman is subject to the laws of 
England, and not of France or Spain, so the Christian is subject to the 
laws of God and Christ in religious matters, and not to human laws. “No 
man can serve two masters.”34 
4. Limits of Earthly Civil Power. Elisha then sets out the “corollar-
ies” of the principles he has deduced from reason and Scripture. The first 
                                                
29 Idem, 9. 
30 Idem, 10-11. 
31 Idem, 9. 
32 Idem, 12. 
33 Idem. 
34 Idem, 13. 
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is that the civil authority has no power to “make or ordain Articles of 
Faith, Creeds, Forms of Worship or Church Government.”35 These mat-
ters have no relationship to the legitimate ends of civil society, and in-
vade the rights of Christ.36 And if the state has no business running the 
church itself, it certainly has no right to “establish any Religion,” e.g., 
religious beliefs, or rules, or kinds of worship, on penalty of civil law. 
To accept that human authorities might so legislate is to confer on 
them the attribute of infallibility. Rather than a single pope, those that 
accept civil rule of religious standards have created literally hundreds of 
popes, for each state and each government is now a final religious 
authority within their jurisdiction.37 But if they err, then what they en-
force is no longer the Bible, but human authority.38 This plainly violates 
the biblical rule of faith and practice. 
In setting out this argument, Elisha expresses a rather sophisticated 
view of Bible reading and interpretation that we usually associate with 
modern thought. Elisha notes that as the Bible is not written as a coher-
ent, self-executing legal code, for the legislature to “enforce” the Bible, it 
will first have to interpret the Bible.39 Thus, what the legislature will im-
plement will not be the Bible itself, but the legislature’s view or under-
standing of what the Bible teaches.40  
This difference between “the Bible” and “the Bible as understood,” 
was an important basis of Elisha’s view of liberty. Thus, his commitment 
to religious liberty rests in part, as Penn’s did, on human epistemological 
limitations in spiritual matters. 
5. Meaning of “Establishment of Religion.” In his discussion of civil 
rule, Elisha provides insights into what “religious establishment” meant 
in the 18th century. Today, some insist it referred only to the creation of a 
national or state church. But Elisha uses the term more broadly than this. 
An establishment of religion for him would be the state attempting to 
enforce any standard, practice, or rule based on the Scriptures, rather 
than on the legitimate ends of government.41  
But at the same time, he was far from being a 20th century constitu-
tionalist. He allowed that, while the state could not legislate on issues of 
                                                
35 Idem, 13. 
36 Idem, 17-18. 
37 Idem, 22. 
38 Idem, 20. 
39 Idem, 21. 
40 Idem. 
41 Idem, 19-20. 
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religion, it could recommend or encourage—“Approbation” or “Recom-
mendation” were the terms Elisha used—certain religious beliefs and 
practices.42 He also saw no conflict between his argument against estab-
lishment and the civil enforcement of agreements between pastors and 
their religious societies for financial support.43  
This amounted to the enforcement of a tax against members of a 
church to support a pastor, whether or not an individual member voted 
for or agreed with the theology of that pastor. While this differed from a 
general assessment in support of religion, it contained enough of an en-
tanglement of church and state to fail modern constitutional muster. 
As a closing matter, Elisha appeals, as Penn did, to the rights of Eng-
lishmen, both under the Magna Charta and the Act of Toleration.44 The 
Connecticut charter, Elisha reminds his readers, was subject to the Act of 
Toleration, and the anti-itinerancy law could thus jeopardize their colo-
nial status. But this, he noted was a relatively small matter, given the fact 
that the right of private judgment and religious liberty was not conferred 
by the Magna Charta or Act of Toleration, but was from God. And all 
those that infringed it would find, in the judgment, that “Christ will be 
King in his own Kingdom.”45 
 
III. Isaac Backus—Self-Made Dissenter 
Unlike either Penn or Williams, Backus did not have the benefit of 
college training. Rather, he was a self-taught, yet highly effective, advo-
cate for religious liberty.46 He was born into a well-to-do Connecticut 
family in 1724, with a father who served in the state Assembly. But 
when Isaac was sixteen his father died. His mother now had to raise 
eleven children on her own. Isaac was needed all the more in the fields of 
the family farm, and college was out of the question.  
Although the family had been dutiful members of the standing order, 
Backus’ religious commitment had been, by his later accounting, shallow 
and careless. But the time of crisis in the Backus family coincided with 
                                                
42 Idem, 19. 
43 Idem, 54. 
44 Idem, 58, 64-65. 
45 Idem, 65. 
46 Details of the life of Isaac Backus found in this section were taken from the intro-
duction of William G. McLoughlin, ed., Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) [“McLoughlin I,”] and from William G. McLoughlin, 
Isaac Backus and the American Pietistic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) 
[“McLoughlin II”]. 
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the outbreak of the Great Awakening and the preaching of George 
Whitefield in 1740. Isaac’s grieving mother was re-awakened with a new 
and deeper conversion experience, and shortly thereafter, so was Isaac.  
Soon Backus was involved in his first experiences of religious con-
troversy. He and his fellow “new light” enthusiasts began to object to the 
half-way covenant arrangement, whereby those with no profession of 
conversion were made church members, in the Congregational Church. 
Defeated in their attempts to reform it, Backus and other “new lights” 
withdrew to begin their own congregation on “purer” principles, allow-
ing in as members only those who described a conversion experience. 
But Backus and his friends found that by separating, they had now 
entered uncharted and perilous legal waters. The New England estab-
lishment had, grudgingly, granted a certain level of toleration to recog-
nized religious groups, such as Anglicans, Quakers, and Baptists. But 
these exceptions were carefully defined and carved out. They did not 
apply to those merely seeking a “purer form” of the established church. 
Backus and his friends had effectively declared revolution against the 
existing order, and many of them were fined and imprisoned.  
Thus began Backus’ first of many experiences in opposing the state 
enforcement of political orthodoxy. It was a journey that would take him 
from the established church, to the separatists, and eventually into the 
Baptist church. It was during his time as a Baptist minister that he wrote 
and spoke most widely and publicly on issues of religious freedom. This 
autodidact eventually wrote the definitive history of Baptists in New 
England and served as a delegate to the Massachusetts convention to rat-
ify the U.S. Constitution. 
A. Setting of An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty. By the 
late 1760s, the scattered Baptist churches had organized into an associa-
tion to bring pressure to bear to make more effective the laws granting 
tax exemptions to their denomination. The association appointed Backus 
as “Agent for the Baptists in New England,” and tasked him with seeking 
remedies for tax grievances, either in the courts or the legislature. Backus 
had some success in this role. At one point in 1771 he appealed to the 
King of England and had the satisfaction of seeing him veto a law of the 
Massachusetts general assembly. 
Yet, the tax exemption system was still cumbersome. It was a system 
of mere toleration and led to prejudice against the Baptists, who were 
considered by many to be tax evaders. The application of the exemptions 
was in the hands of local towns and parishes, which at times misused and 
misapplied them. In 1773, the association considered whether it should 
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adopt a church-wide policy of civil disobedience and refuse to seek the 
exemption or pay the taxes. In the end, they authorized each church to 
decide whether to take this drastic step. At the same time, they voted to 
widely publish and distribute copies of Isaac Backus’ An Appeal to the 
Public for Religious Liberty, an attack on the “tyranny” of the tax-
exemption system. 
B. Overview of An Appeal to the Public. Penn and Williams started 
at opposite ends of the natural theology spectrum. Penn began with the 
nature and rights of God and the heavenly government, Williams with 
the nature and obligations of man and civil government. But Backus 
starts at a third point off of that continuum, that of biblical revelation and 
its teaching regarding the fallen nature of man and the proper roles of 
civil and ecclesiastical rulers.47 But these are arguably three points of a 
connected triangle and, in the end, the arguments share more ground then 
they exclude. 
Backus explicitly rejects the Lockean state of nature reasoning, re-
lied on explicitly by Williams, and also implicitly used by Penn. He as-
serts that because of man’s fall, and his subsequent sinful nature, that he 
naturally possesses no real freedom or liberty, but is in bondage. Man 
does not give up rights and freedom by entering society. Rather, man 
must “submit to some government in order to enjoy any liberty and secu-
rity at all.”48  
In the Bible, Backus argues, God has appointed two kinds of gov-
ernments, civil and ecclesiastical, to create order and opportunity for lib-
erty. But these two kinds of governments are very different, and his ar-
gument for religious freedom is largely based on those differences.  
1. Differences between Civil and Church Governments. Backus be-
gins by noting the differences in the Bible between civil and ecclesiasti-
cal governments and the history of these governments. What is interest-
ing about this section is that despite rejecting Locke’s ideas about the 
state of nature at the opening of his essay, his argument here seems to 
borrow from Lockean ideas about states deriving their authority from the 
people. While the notion or propriety of social contract between ruler and 
ruled is not denied by the Bible, it is hard to argue that it is affirmatively 
set out there. So despite his stated attempts to construct a biblical theol-
ogy of church and state, Backus detours, and not for the last time, into 
arguments of natural theology that parallel those of Penn and Williams.  
                                                
47 McLoughlin I, 310-311. 
48 Idem, 312. 
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2. Blending of the Civil and Spiritual. Backus then goes over the his-
tory of force entering the church, first under Constantine, and then in the 
medieval church through the time of the Reformation. He then turns to 
more current examples of church/state combinations. He details how 
church and state have been inappropriately combined in Massachusetts 
and how this institution differs, both in nature and effects, from that set 
out in the Bible.  
He argues that taxation in support of ministers violates the teaching 
of Scripture, which is that “they which preach the Gospel shall live of the 
Gospel” (1 Cor 9:13-14).49 He cites two well known New England di-
vines to the effect that the tax support of the ministers makes them the 
“king’s ministers” who minister in the “king’s name.”50 This is a prima 
facie violation, in Backus’ view, of Christ’s command that his kingdom 
“is not of this world.”  
His latter argument here is an application of belief that church and 
state have separate, “dual jurisdictions.” The rationale behind the “dual 
jurisdiction” doctrine, he writes, rests largely on two separate points—
the nature and the effect of proper government institutions.51 The nature 
of church government in Massachusetts was to make pastors ministers of 
the king, but in reality, they should be ministers of God. The effect of 
this state government was that it made the majority the test of orthodoxy. 
This power had been used in the state to imprison, whip, and banish men 
only for denying infant baptism. 
In his dual jurisdictions view and his belief in the inability of the leg-
islature or the majority to arrive at reliable spiritual truth, Backus is mak-
ing an epistemological argument similar to that of Penn and Williams. 
Later on he writes explicitly about the “right of private religious judg-
ment.” But this right flows by necessity from his rejection of the legisla-
ture’s ability to determine spiritual truth.  
3. Spiritual Standards of Epistemology, Authority, and Use of Force. 
While he gets there less directly than Penn and Williams, Backus ends up 
at basically the same place in regards to spiritual epistemology, religious 
authority, and use of force. But first, he disclaims, in another rejection of 
Locke, that the Baptists were making arguments from natural rights. 
Backus insists that his claims rest on the “Charter privilege,” the legal 
rights of Englishmen to be free of religious discrimination. Even this 
                                                
49 Idem, 318. 
50 Idem. 
51 Idem, 320-321. 
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close to the revolution, the Baptists had not yet fully decided which 
camp, loyalist or revolutionary, would best defend their interests. 
The language of rights was being used at the time to propose revolu-
tion against England. Yet at this point the Baptist’s best defense against 
religious laws was often their charter privileges under British law. This 
was shown by Backus’ earlier invalidation of a state law by an appeal to 
the king. So at this point, Backus was hedging his bets, practically if not 
ideologically. He rested on practical legal protections rather than more 
grandiose, but less enforceable philosophical ones that might actually 
undercut the existing legal protections. 
In conclusion, Backus makes explicit what has lain beneath the sur-
face of his arguments. And these are the essential points of both Penn 
and Williams. Backus, echoing Williams, states that the disability of civil 
government in spiritual matters rests on the truth that “each one has an 
equal right to judge for himself, for we must all appear before the judg-
ment seat of Christ” (2 Cor 5:10).52 Every man has not only the right, but 
the responsibility, to “judge for himself” and to act “according to the per-
suasion of his own mind.”53 
He argues that to place an earthly power between God and man is to 
usurp the role and place of God. It makes men judges of spiritual matters, 
a role they have no right to play.54 He notes that the exemption system 
itself is based on a notion of inequality. Why do the Baptists need to seek 
exemptions from the established church, and not vice versa? Backus 
would not appear to accept Williams’ notion that the state can “encour-
age” or “promote” a particular religious view.  
And he returns to his theme of “no jurisdiction” of civil authority in 
religious matters: that no force can be used in those matters. So, while 
arriving there by a somewhat different route, Backus ultimately rests on 
the three points common to Penn and Williams: the sacred syllogism of 
personal spiritual knowledge, no earthly spiritual authority, and the non-
jurisdiction of civil power in spiritual matters.  
 
IV. Conclusion: A Quaker, a Puritan, and a Baptist Meet 
It is doubtful whether any of the three men discussed in this essay 
ever met in person. Penn died before Backus was born and was geo-
graphically distant from a youthful Williams. There is a chance that 
                                                
52 Idem, 332. 
53 Idem, 335. 
54 Idem, 333. 
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Backus and Williams could have met; but social, class, and religious dif-
ferences probably conspired to prevent it. While they were on similar 
sides of some of the Great Awakening debates, they were participants in 
very different venues and social levels.  
All three were separated by tremendous philosophical and religious 
differences. Williams embraced Locke, Backus rejected Locke, and Penn 
wrote prior to him, although he drew on similar sorts of reasoning. 
Backus accepted Scripture only as guide, Williams accepted scripture 
and reason, and Penn would have placed “enlightened, inner, spiritual 
reason” even ahead of Scripture. Yet, all these differences did not pre-
vent them from coming to remarkably similar conclusions regarding re-
ligious liberty, using remarkably similar theological arguments.  
It is where their minds meet that is most interesting and important for 
our purpose of finding a common theological impulse to separation. 
Apart from the individual contributions made by each and discussed 
above, two themes common to all deserve particular attention. The first 
is the use of both revealed and natural theology, or metaphysical phi-
losophy. The second is the syllogism of spiritual epistemology, religious 
authority, and the “no jurisdiction of force” conclusion. 
A. Natural Theology and Limiting Government. Penn and Wil-
liams made explicit distinctions, both in the form and substance of their 
arguments, between arguments based on reason about God and ultimate 
realities and arguments based on biblical authority. Backus appeared to 
reject the use of philosophy in his arguments, but as noted in the discus-
sion of his arguments, in a number of places he relied on it in practice. 
This distinction between natural theology and revealed theology, 
rather obscured presently, helps answer one of today’s constitutional co-
nundrums: if the Constitution forbids the implementation of religious 
ideas by the state, and if the idea of religious liberty rests on a religious 
or theological base, then how can the Constitution protect religious lib-
erty without running afoul of its own restrictions?  
Penn and Williams would respond by saying, as did Thomas Jeffer-
son in his Declaration of Independence, that there are certain universal 
truths about God and his requirements on humanity, relating to basic jus-
tice and fairness, which are capable of being understood by all persons 
everywhere. These truths or ideas may also be contained in Scripture, but 
they are not unique to Scripture and as such are a legitimate basis of pub-
lic acts and policy.  
If Backus had been completely consistent with his stated policy of 
only using arguments based entirely in Scripture, he would have run into 
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this logical conundrum: how could he criticize the establishment for leg-
islating based on religious beliefs, when his argument that they should 
not was also a purely religious belief? But both Williams and Penn did 
themselves, or rather their posterity, a service by grounding their argu-
ments, at least in part, in a philosophy that was not exclusively or en-
tirely reliant on scripture.55 
B. The “Sacred Syllogism” and the Priesthood of Believers. The 
most frequent and recurring basis of the trios’ call for religious liberty 
and disestablishment was the syllogism of the limits of human spiritual 
epistemology, the lack of human spiritual authority, and the resulting “no 
jurisdiction of force” in spiritual matters. In summarizing Backus’ and 
the Baptists’ commitment to the separation of Church and State, historian 
William McLoughlin attaches a helpful doctrinal label that captures this 
recurring constellation of ideas. He writes that the separatist impulse, 
apart from its very real pragmatic motives, “sprang from the resurgence 
of the pietistic doctrines of the priesthood of all believers and of the 
gathered, voluntaristic church.”56 McLoughlin believes that this impulse 
was somehow unique to the anti-elite, anti-hierarchical Baptist polity. 
But these same ideas also emerge in the arguments of Williams and 
Penn.  
It would be another project to show the roots of these shared ideas in 
the priesthood of believers doctrine, coming primarily from Luther, and 
being most fully embraced by Anabaptists, and then English Baptists. 
                                                
55 Today, we have largely lost the language of natural theology. It is assumed that 
any “God” talk is religious and inappropriate for use in public policy or discourse. But by 
this standard, the Declaration of Independence itself, with its references to the “Creator,” 
is a religious document and violates the Constitution. Indeed, the First Amendment, with 
its elevation of the realm of the religious to special status, based on the philosophy of the 
Declaration, would also infringe this purported principle. 
Perhaps we need to re-discover the view of the founders that religion, as Madison 
put it, is “the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it.”55 Re-
ligion in this sense is not merely any reference or acknowledgement that a God or a sa-
cred realm, beyond the legitimate reach of government, exists. Indeed, the founders 
viewed as crucial to our theory of civil liberties these metaphysical facts and the limits on 
the state that flow from them. 
Perhaps the Pledge of Allegiance case is easier than we think. To admit that we are 
one nation “under God” tells no citizen how they must behave religiously. But it does tell 
the state that there is another jurisdiction, another realm of human belief and conduct, 
over which it does not have authority. In this sense, the pledge may be more for school 
teachers and public officials than it is for the students. As Penn, Williams, and Backus 
would all agree, the state needs constant reminding of its limits. 
56 McLoughlin II, 232 (emphasis added). 
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But we do know that Penn, Williams, and Backus were Protestants of 
one stripe or another, and all three had a certain common, core heritage. 
Part of the essence of that heritage included the priesthood of believers 
and all that that implied about direct access to God and spiritual truth, no 
earthly spiritual intermediates or authorities, and the right of private 
spiritual judgment. As historical theologian Alister McGrath recently put 
it, in his view the single most influential—and dangerous—idea to come 
out of the Protestant Reformation was the belief that the Bible, in its 
main themes, could and should be understood and interpreted by all be-
lievers. As he puts it: 
 
The idea that lay at the heart of the sixteenth-century Refor-
mation, which brought Anglicanism and the other Protestant 
churches into being, was that the Bible is capable of being un-
derstood by all Christian believers—and that they all have the 
right to interpret it and to insist upon their perspectives being 
taken seriously.57 
 
McGrath also identifies this idea as an expression or outgrowth of 
Luther’s “doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers.” This doc-
trine gave “every Christian the right to interpret the Bible and to raise 
concerns about any aspect of the church’s teaching or practice that ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the Bible.”58 McGrath sees this related group 
of ideas surrounding the priesthood of believers—notions of the perspi-
cuity of the central teachings of Scripture, the supreme authority of 
Scripture, and the right to personal interpretation of Scripture—as being 
the defining thread that runs through the story of Protestantism’s en-
gagement and encounter with western culture and society.  
McGrath does not deal with the legal question of disestablishment or 
the religious arguments underlying it. But the ubiquity of this doctrine in 
the writings of these three, disparate religious personalities does tend to 
support McGrath’s argument that the right to scriptural interpretation did 
have a wide and varied impact on western society. It also supports the 
argument of this paper that the religious impulse to disestablishment had 
an integrated doctrinal core. It was a core that both motivated the relig-
ious community and also inspired other, more publicly accessible and 
                                                
57 Alister McGrath, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea: The Protestant Revolution—A 
History From the Sixteenth Century to the Twenty-First (New York: Harper Collins, 
2007), 2. 
58 Ibid. 52-53, 199-200. 
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civilly legitimate arguments from natural theology and philosophy for 
disestablishment. 
Page Smith, the American historian, once said that “the Protestant 
Reformation produced a new kind of consciousness and a new kind of 
man. . . . Luther and Calvin, by postulating a single ‘individual’ soul re-
sponsible for itself, plucked a new human type out of [the] traditional 
‘order’ and put him down naked, a re-formed individual in a re-formed 
world. The doctrine of a “priesthood of believers,” with each person re-
sponsible directly to God for his or her own spiritual state . . . brought 
remarkable new opportunities . . . and indeed, entire new communi-
ties.”59 
What we have found here supports that claim. In looking for the 
ideological roots of separation, it would be short-sighted to rely entirely 
on Republican and Enlightenment thought and to overlook the theologi-
cal contribution of the Reformation doctrine of the priesthood of believ-
ers. Seventh-day Adventists have a particular interest in this doctrinal 
foundation, as it also provides the basis for the Adventist view of the 
sanctuary doctrine. It was the re-discovery of Christ’s high-priestly min-
istry in the heavenly sanctuary, and our direct access to Him as believers, 
that brought to view the priesthood of believers here on earth.  
From this view, the sanctuary doctrine, rather than being a purely 
unique Adventist insight, is actually, at least at its roots, shared com-
monly throughout Protestant Christianity. Perhaps Adventists would be 
in a position to better share their unique insights on the sanctuary doc-
trine with others if we were more conscious of the pervasive influence 
and significant impact that the roots of this doctrine have had among our 
Protestant friends and their forebears. For it is only a persistent and 
broadly-rooted doctrine that could unify the church/state thought—and 
cause a meeting of the minds—of a Quaker, a Puritan, and a Baptist. 
 
Nicholas P. Miller is Director of the Andrews University International Religious Liberty 
Institute and Associate Professor of Church History at the S.D.A. Theological Seminary. 
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